'Tribalism' Back From The Dead

As far as unfortunate book reviews go, Stanley Kurtz's Weekly Standard treatment of Culture and Conflict in the Middle East, Philip Carl Salzman's rather oddly abbreviated 224-page manifesto, is 'up there.' That said, when we search for faults in a book review bearing a subheading that reads, 'Tribalism may offer a clearer view of our enemies' motivations,' perhaps we have found too easy a target. In Salzman's words, the book asks 'Why, in the Middle East, [do] we so reliably find relentless partisanship, unending conflict, and conscienceless repression of those not holding power'? Let us ignore for a moment the question's rather grand predications.

Drawing on his ethnographic work on the Yarahmadzai of Iranian Baluchistan in the 1970s, Salzman finds his answer in 'Arab culture, grounded in Bedouin culture.' While serving its subjects well in 'segmentary tribal settings,' this culture is, in Salzman's estimation, 'uncongenial to inclusive polities and universalistic legal regimes.' Here we find once again the proverbial 'tribal mentality' about which we have all heard a great deal; and yet its continued espousal never fails to surprise those of us actually, as it were, 'on the ground.' Salzman's work is structured around the argument that 'Arab tribalism' is a long-suffering and presently unfashionable category that just happens to hold greater explanatory power for the region's current travails than any other consideration.

Judging by Salzman's synthesis, this already-reaching notion holds up about as well as one could expect for a thesis developed out of and plucked from the author's personal work with a discrete and insular grouping in the southeast of Iran and then spread—without much regard for, say, linguistic, sectarian, geographic, and ethnic categories (the less said about temporal considerations the better)—to present-day Arab politics. The author attempts to do away with concerns over this disjuncture by pointing out that social science is a collaborative affair and that the secondary literature just happens to corroborate his empirical work. Let us be assured that this is an admission that under more rigorous circumstances, Salzman's empirical work would bear the most tendentious relationship with the book's scope. And then there's that title.

In any event, this all proves too much for Kurtz, who writes throughout the laudatory review as though—and, no, I do not exaggerate and, yes, it pains me to write this—there were no differences (not even cleavages!) among the categories 'Arab,' 'Iranian,' and 'Muslim.' Kurtz is thrilled with the fashionably unfashionable appearance of the book and immediately takes its conclusions out for a stroll:

Arab tribesmen are preoccupied with maintaining deterrence and prepared to use force preemptively, if necessary--rather like über neocons. The ironic but very real parallel is a function of the de facto stateless anarchy in which Arab Bedouin live--and the de facto global anarchy that hawkish conservatives rightly believe to be the underlying reality of the international system. Saddam Hus-sein's interest in being taken to possess WMDs, whether or not he actually had them, makes sense in light of the link between deterrence and reputation. The emboldening effects of America's pre-9/11 retreats in Somalia, Lebanon, and elsewhere show the reverse of the medal. Although this is a familiar litany, I'd argue that the fatwa against Salman Rushdie, the rage against the Muhammad cartoons, the killing of Theo van Gogh, and a host of related acts of intimidation ought to be placed under the heading of pro-active deterrence as well.

And there you have it. Moroccan-born militants in northern Europe (van Gogh's killer was, after all, Moroccan), Iranian clerics, secular-left Arab dictators—the appearance and behavior of these personages and phenomena can be explained by a simple referral back to 'Arabs' segmentary tribalism.' Finally, that meddlesome region has found the explanatory variable that has long eluded us. In the end, one can hardly be certain of how to respond appropriately to Salzman's posture and the inevitable hand-maiden's role it will play among certain crowds. Certainly, one could be bewildered, and certainly one could be perturbed. At least concerning the hawkish cheerleaders already cheering the book's release—as though Salzman's work constituted some sort academic validation—I am perfectly satisfied to simply consider the source. (Also, check out that advanced praise.)